Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Master's Theses

Theses and Dissertations

1961

A Critical Review of the Jurisdictional Standards of the National
Labor Relations Board Prior to the Enactment of Section 701 of
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosing Act of 1959
Martin John Burns
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses
Part of the Labor Relations Commons

Recommended Citation
Burns, Martin John, "A Critical Review of the Jurisdictional Standards of the National Labor Relations
Board Prior to the Enactment of Section 701 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosing Act of
1959" (1961). Master's Theses. 1550.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/1550

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1961 Martin John Burns

A CRITICAL Rb.YIEW OF THE JURISDICTIONAL STANDARDS OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION
701 OF THE LABOR-MAN},GEMENT REPORTING
AND DISCLOSING ACT OF 1959

by
Martin J. Burns

A Thesis Submitted to the Faoulty of the Institute of Sooial and Industrial
Relations of Loyola UniverSity in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requlrments for the Degree of Master ot Sooial
and Industrial Relations

February
1961

LIFE
Martin John Burns was born in Chioago, Illinoi8, November 10, 1927.
He wal graduated from Leo High Sohool, Chicago, Illinois, June 1945, from
Loyola University at Chioago, February, 1951, with the Degree of Baohelor ot
Soience in Commeroe, and trom the Law Sohool of Loyola University at Chioago,
June, 1962, with the Degree of Juri. Doctor.
From 1963 to 1968, the author was employed

8S

an attorney by O. David

Zimring, the General Counsel of the Amalgamated Association ot Street, Electrio
Railway and Motor Coach Employees of Ameriee, AFL-CIO.

From Ootober, 1968,

to April, 1960, he was employed a8 a field attorney by the National Labor Relations Board.
Jaoobs and Gore,

Since April, 1960, he has been assooiated with the firm of
8

Chioago labor law firm whioh represents various Interna-

tional and Looal unions.

He began his graduate 8tudies at Loyola University

in February, 1963.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter
I.

Page
INTRODUCTION • • • •

. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. •

•

1

THE LEGAL LIMITS OF THE BOr'PeD' S JURISDICTION • • • • • • • • •

3

Legal jurisdiotion of the National Labor Relations Board
and the federal pre-emption dootrine--Soope of thesis-Souroe materiels.
II.

Passage of the National Labor Relations Aot--Hesitanoy of
Board to prooeed in early yeara--Supreme Court deaisions
interpreting soop. of Board's legal jurisdiotion.
III.

THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION ON

,~

CASE TO CASE Ml<!THOD

• • • •

8

Jurisdiotion further extended by Court deoisions--Board
begins to deoline to exeroise ita jurisdiotion--Effeot
of deolination in oertain industriel.

rl.

Tnil! 1950 AND THE 1954 STANDARDS FOR ASSERTING JURI[}DICTION • •

13

Establishment of standards in Ootober 1950--Prob1em of
retroaotion application of standards--Applioation of
standards to oonstruotion and hotel industries--Revi.ion
of standards in 1954--Reasons advanoed for revision-Views of dissenting Board membera--Effeot of disagreement
of Board members--Ana1ysi8 of statistio. used by Board.

v.

1954 TO 1959 --

DEVELOPM~T

OF A "NO-MAN' S LANDlt • • • • • • •

25

Explanation of federal pre-emption dootrine--Supreme
Court deciSions holding states may not aot if Board
deolines to assert jurladiction--Att«mpts by Congress to
remedy situetion--Inoreased appropriation for Board-Revision of standards in 1958--Further Congressional
attempts to eliminate "no-man' 8 land."

VI.

ANALYSIS AND C(J\jCLUSIONS • • • • • • • • •

. . ... .....

Original intent of Congress a. supported by Supreme Court
deoialona--Legislative history of ~ft-Hartley Aot-Analysis of oourt deoisions supporting poSitIon that Board
1T

34

v

may properly deoline to exeroise jurisdiotion--Analysis
ot Seotion 9 (0) ot the Aot--Congressional attempts
to olarify Board's jurisdiotion--Praotioal diffioulties
of exeroising jurisdiotion--Po8sible solutions to
problem.
BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

. .. .. .

51

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

No comprehensive study of the participation of the United States government in the field of industrial relations is complete without detailing the
legal jurisdiotion of the National Labor Relations Board and the Board's exercise of that jurisdiotion.

For the federal government cannot oonstitutioJl-

ally aot through the Board unless Congress has the authority to legislate in
this tield.

In edditioJl, the Board

81

an administrative agenoy may only aot

in aooordanoe with the intent ot Congress

.1

let torth in the pertinent legis-

lation •
A related legal

probl~

arises because of our dual system ot governmsnt.

Under the tederal pre-emption rulse as presoribed in Artiole VI. Par. 2 ot the
Constitutions and developed by the United States Supreme Court, Congress may
legislate in a partioular area in suoh a manner as to deprive the states ot
power to legislate in the same area.
This thesis is intended to present a history

or

the legal jurisdiotioJl

of the Board and the exeroise ot, or failure to exercise, that jurilliiotion.
More partioularly, it is intended to analyze whether the Board oan legally
deoline to exeroise its legal jurisdiotion and thereby oreate e ftno-man's land"
where the Board does not exeroise jurisdiction and the states 08n!lOt legally
aot beoause of the federal pre-emption rule.
1

Suoh

8

"no-man's land" haa

I

!

2
resulted from the Board's jurisdiotional polioies and has oaused great conoern
to almost everyone interested in this field.
Many individual aspeots of the problems treated herein have bean the subjeot of prior analysis, partioularly in 18W review artioles.

However, no

prior work in this area has the soope of this thesis, and the writer believes
that suoh an over-all view is easentional to an understanding of the issue.
~Yents

ooourring in the 1960's are direotly tied in with other events which

took place in the 1930's and/or 1940's.

This is espeoially true when the legal

oonoept of preoedent is involved.
The basio souroe materials used were the reported deoisions ot the Board
oonoerning its jurisdiotion, the federal oourt deoisions relating thereto, the
annual reports of

~he

Board, the legislative history of the statutes involved,

law review artioles and other papers and work. relating to this subjeot.

CHAPTER II

THE LEGAL LIMITS OF THE
BOARD'S JURISDICTION
The signing by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on July 5, 1935 of the
National Labor Relations Aotl inaugurated a new era in industrial relations.
The aot defined the right of self-organization ot employes in industry tor the
purpose of oollective bargaining and provided methods by whioh the federal
The National Labor Relations Board was

gOTernment oould safeguard this right.

established to hear and determine oases in whioh it was oharged that this legal
right was denied or abridged, and to oonduot elections to asoertain the ohosen
representatives ot employes.
The Aot limited the jurisdiotion of the Board to the investigation ot
questions "affeoting oommeroe" oonoerning the reprenentation of employes
(Seotion 9 (0) ), and to the prevention of unfair labor praotioes, enumerated
in Seotion 8, "affeoting oommeroe ft (Seotion 10 (a».

Seotion 2 (6) of the

Aot defined ftoommeroeft to mean
trade, traffio, oommeroe, transportation, or oommunioation among the
seTeral States, or between the Distriot of Columbia or any Territory
ot the United States and any State or other Territory, or between any
toreign oountry and any State, Territory, or the Distriot of Columbia,
or wi thin the Distriot of Columbia or a.ny Terri tory, or between points
in the same State but through any other State or any Territory or the
Distriot ot Columbia or any foreign oountry.

149 Stat. 449 (1935). 29 U.S.C.A. 151-166 (1946).
3

4

The term "affeoting oommerce" was detined in Seotion 2 (7) to mean
in oommeroe, or burdening or obstruoting oommeroe or the tree tlow
of oommeroe, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dl'pute
burdening or obstruoting oommeroe or the free flow ot commeroe.
This particularization of the Board's jurisdiction was oooasioned by the
oonstitutional limitation of Congress' power to regulate

oommer~e

among the

several states and to pass laws neoessary and proper for oarrying into exeoution this power.2

It was intended that the Board's authority be co-extensive

with this federal power un the Constitution, but it is doubtful that anyone
was aware of how extensive this power would prove to be.

In it. early years

the Board was oareful to prooeed only in those oases as to whioh it believed
the oourts would sustain federal jurisdiotion.
that labor situations involving

~etail

The Board was of the opinion

trade or other purely looal business"

plainly fell outside of the federal power under the oommeroe olause. 3

Up to

October 1, 1936, there were 1,551 oharges and petitions tiled with the Board.
Of this number, 153 had been dismissed by the Board and the regional direotors
betore the issuanoe of a formal complaint, and 343 were withdrawn before
federal aotion.

At least seventy-one of the 153 dismissed were beoause the

Board did not oonsider that oommeroe was affeoted within the meaning of the
Aot, and many of the 343

08881

were withdrawn beoause of advioe by the regional

direotors that the Board would not takejurisdiotion tor the same reason. 4
The Board's hesitanoy to prooeed was well founded at that time.

~Vhl1e

the

2U. S. Constitution, Artiole I, Seotion 8.
3First Annual Report ot the National Labor Relations Board, (Washington,
1937), p. 135.
- 4~., p. 136.

federal oourt. sustained the Board's legal jurisdiotion in
interstate motor-bus transportation, telegraph, press

oaSElS

involving

88800ia tiona

,motor

truok transportation and similar industries direotly related to interstate
oommeroe, the lower federal oourts generally held th&t the power of Congress
under the commerce olause did not extend to relations between employers and
their employees engaged in manufacture or local produotion.

It was not until

April 12. 1937 that the Supreme Court in three decisions upheld the Board'.s
legal jurisdiotion over produoing or manufaoturing enterprises whioh, in oonneetion with their operations, reoeive or ship in interstate oommeroe
at.ntial part of their raw materials or manufactured produot••
Jones! Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.
301

u.s.

49J

!.~.!.~. ~.

The deoision in eaoh case
four justices dissenting.

s.

1; !..~..!!..!.

sub-

N .L.R.B. v.

!.. Fruehauf Trailer

Friedman-Harry Mark. Clothing Co., 301 U.
W.8

8

s.

~.,

58.

supported by thetive justioes, with the remaining

In Jones and Laughlin the majority states that

int~

state activities whioh have a olose and substantial relation to interstate
oommeroe so that their oontrol is necessary to proteot oommeroe trom burdens
and obstruotions

oa~

be r~gulste~ by Congress.

It is • • • apparent that the taot that the employees here conoerned
were engaged in produotion is not determinative. The question remain.
as to the effeot upon interstate oommeroe of the labor praotioes
involved. 5
The Court went on to hold that the aotivities of the employer were on a national sode, and thus, Congress oould regulate ita industrial relations in
order to proteot interstate oommerce trom the consequenoes of industrial war.
These

o~ses

established that

5301 U. S. at p. 40.

neither 8ize, interstate ramifioations, reletive position in the
industry, oharaoter of the oommodities produoed, nor number of
employess involved, is a oontrolling faotor in determining whether
the aot may be oonstitutionally applied to 8 given manufacturing
or produoing ~lterpri3e.6
The test of the Board's jurisdiotion was, rather, whether a oessation of operetions oaused by industrial strife would substantially interrupt the flow ot
interstate oommeroe.
Two years later, in 1939, the Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the Aot was applioable to employers, not themselves engaged
in interstate oommeroe, who operated a relatively small business of prooessing
materia ls whi oh were transmitted to them by the owners through the ohannels
of interstn te commerc'9 and which, after prooessing, were di str! buted
such channels.

thl')ll~h

Expresssd differently, the question was whether an employer's

operations must be large enough to be ot national importanoe in order to oome
under the Aot.

The Court upheld the jurisdiotion of the Board.?

The Court

stated that it did not think it important that the volume of oommeroe involved
w~s

relatively

sm~ll

as

oom~pred

with oases which it had considered previously.

Tho Court wrote:
The power of Congress to regulate interstate oommeroe is plenery end
extends to all suoh oommeroe be it great or small. ••
The amount
ot the oommeroe regulated is of sp~ci81 significance only to the extent that Congress may be taken to have excluded commeroe of small
volume from the operation of its regulatory measure by express provision or fair implication. The language of the • • • Aot seems to
make it plain that Congress set no restriotions upon the jurisdiction
of the Board to be determined or fixed exclUSively by reforence to the
volume of interstate oommeroe involved. ••• The Act on its faoe

6Seoond Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board, (Washington,
19Sa), p. 56.

--

?N.~.~.~. v. ~inblatt.

!! ~..

306 U.S. 601.

7

thus evidenoes the intention of. Congress to exeroise whatever power
is oonstitutionally given to it to regulate oommeroe by the adoption
of measures for the prevention or control of oertain speoifiedaots unfair labor praotices - whioh proToke or tend to provoke strikes or
labor disturbanoes affeoting interstate commerce. Given the oth('lr
needful oondi tiona. oomrleroe . y be affeoted in the same manner and to 1ie
same extent in proportion to its volume. whethe~ it be great or small.
EKamining the Act in the light of ita purpose and of the oiroumstanoes
in whioh it must be applied we can peroeive no besis for inferring any
intention of Congress to make the operation of the Aot depend on any
partioular volume of oommeroe effeoted more than that to whioh courts
would apply the Inaxim de minimis. 8
The Court went on to point out that there are many industries which are axtensively engaged in interstate oommeroe even though oonducted by relatively
small units, and thot some. like the clothing industry, are extenSively unioniled and have had a "long and tragio history of industrial strife."'
The Fainblatt deoision is important sinoe it so firmly rejected the argument that a substantial or particular amount of oommeroe must be involved before the Board would have jurisdiotion.

As more fully developed below. the

Courtts deoision is oonsistent with the intention of Congress a8 evidenoed by
its rejeotion of a proposal to exolude employees of small employers from the
ooverage of the original Aot.

And yet the Board. whioh had fought to have its

jurisdiotion upheld in the Fainblatt oase. subsequently took aotion whioh
diminished the full impaot of the decision.

8

Ibid., pp. 606-607.

9Ibid ., p. 607.

r
GHA PT};~H. II I

In the immediate yesrs after Faiublatt the Board oontinued to assert
jurisdiotion over more and more companies in various industries and was upheld,
in most instanoes. by the federal courts.

In

~.L.R.!. ~.

Bradford Dyeing

Assn~

310 U. $. 318, the Supreme Court upheld the applioability of the Aot to an

employer whose operations constituted a relatively small peroentage of his industry's oapaoity, and held that the Board's jurisdiotion was not defeated by
the possibility that the employer's oustomers might be able to seoure the ssme
servioe from other local processors if a labor dispute should stop the interstate flow of materials to and from the employer's plant.
Allianoe!..

. .!.,

~.~.!

In Polish National

322 U. S. 643, involving a fraternal benefit sooiety

whloh engaged in a oommercial life insuranoe business throughout the United
States, the Supreme Court stated that in determining whether or not presoribed
practices would adversely affect

commero~

tne Board was not limited to the

quantitative effect of the activities immediately before it.
Approprbte for judgment is the fact tnat the immediate situation is
representative of many others throughout the oountry, the total incidenoe of whioh if left unchecked may well become far-reaching in
its harm to oommeroe. 1

1322 U. S. at 646.
8

9

The oumulative effect of these and other cases oonoerning the legal limits of
the Board's jurisdiotion forces the conolusion that "untold small enterprises
are subjeot to the power of the Board. ft2
Onoe this broad legal jurisdiotion was firmly established, one would imagine that th.e Board would exercise its juriadioti0u to the fullest in order to
bring the benefits of the Aot to an many employees as possible.

However, the

Boa rd aoon took the position that it would better effectuate the purposes of
the Aot
not to exeroise its jurisdl~tion to the fullest extent possible
• • • but to limit that exeroise to enterprises whose oparations
have, or at whioh labor disputes would have, 9 pronounced impaot
upon the flow of interstate oO~4erce.3
Claiming that limitation of funds and personnel mede it impossible to handle
all oases affecting oommeroe, the Board began to deoline to assert its legal
jurisdiotion in C6seS which came before it on the ground that to assert jurisdiction would not efft;ctuate the polioies of tte Aot.
olination of jurisdiotion oocurred on

~

oase-t-csaG o8sis; i.e., in eaoh oase

whioh o&me before it the Board would deoide
.hould be asserted.

Prior to 1950 this de-

whe~'Gr

its legal jurisdiotion

Not only was muoh time and effort obvioue1y spent in .1-

certaining the jurisdiotional faots in eaoh case, but muoh oonfusion arose beoause it could not be predicted in advance how the Board woul! rule; different
rules-of-thumb e.pplied for various industries, and even wi thin the s&rne
industry.

N.

!.

2Seprarate opinion of Mr. Justioe Frankfurter in Bethlehem Steel Co. v.
Stete ~ Board, 380 U. ~. 767, 782-783.
3Hollow Tree Lumber ~ •• 91 N.L.R.B. 636.

10
The Board's polioy under this oase-to-cale approaoh as to firms engaged
in manufaoturing appears to have been to take jurisdiotion over all suoh firm.,
exoept those whioh were very small.·

However, the decisions indioate a reluo-

tanoe to take jurisdiction of firms engaged in making food produots, e.g.,
bread or dair products,S and household artioles. 6 The mining industry appear.
to have been treated as manufaoturing, with jurisdiotion not being asserted
over very small mining firms. 7

Prior to the Taft-Hartley Aot in 19478 the

Board generally deolined to assert jurisdiotion over construotion firms on the
ground that their operations were essentially looal.

Subsequent to Taft-

Hartley, and prior to 1950, the Board took jurisdiction over suoh firms. 9

In

the publio utility field, the Board generally took jurisdiotion over looal bus
lines whioh serviced employees of oompanies
oonnected with interstate oarriers. 10

en~ged

in interstate oommerce or

But, in at least one instanoe, the

Board deolined jurisdiotion over a large, important bus line in the City of
Chioago. ll

As

to gas and eleotrio utilities, while the Board generally took

'See, for example, Aome Corrugated Box Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 96, Puritee
Thermometer ~., 87 N.L.R.B ••7J Nationa~oot Company, 78 N.L.R.B. 625.
5~-Ia.en Bakery, ~., 78 N.L.R.B. 198. Skyline Cooperative Dairies,
83 N.L.R.B. 1010.

:,Bnetroit canvas Manufaoturers Ass'n., 80 N.L.R.B. 267.
"See, for example, Superior Stone Produots, I~, 88 N.L.R.B. 736, Southwest )letah, 72 N.L.R.B. 54; )lason &: Son Coal CO., 72 N.L.R.B. 196.
8Labor Management Relations Aot, 1947, 29 U.S.e.A. Seo. 161, 61 Stat. 136.
9See , for example, Watlon's SteOia1tz ShO~. 80 N.L.R.B. 533, Samuel
Langer, 82 N.L.R.B. 1028; Wadswort , 81 N.L.R •• 804.
lOSee, for example, El Paso-Isleta Bus Line, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 1149,
Rosedale Pauenger Lines,""'Yno., 85 N.t.R.B. m7
llChioago Motor Coa oh Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 890.

11

jurisdiotion,l2 it twice deolined to assert jurisdiotion over small rural
eleotric oooperatiTes. l3
In the servioe industries, the Board deolined to assert jurisdiotion OTer
hotels, regardless of size. 14

It generally refused to take jurisdiotion OTer

laundry and dry oleaning establishments,16

unless they serTioed fiMas engaged

in interstate oommeroe,16 and had a similar test for other sorTioe firms,
suoh

8S

those rendering plant proteotion, building maintenanoe, and reporting

and transoribing prooeedings before government agenoies and oongressional
oommittees. 17
In the retail trade industry, the Board apparently found its most diffioult jurisdiotional problems under this oase-to-oaS6 approaoh.

It made or

developed many distinotions to justify aifferent treatment for different kind.
of retail outlets; e.g., between franchised and non-franohised dealers or between department stross and speoialty shops. Any analysis of some of the
oisions in this industry

8S

well

8S

de-

the other industries oonsidered above

12See , for example, Paoifio Gas and Eleotrio Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 267, East
Central Oklahoma CooperatiTe, fn~:;-87lf.L.R.B. 6047
13Irwin County Eleotrio Membership CoSp., 88 N.L.R.B. 718, Platte-Clay
Electrio CboperatiTe, Ino., 83 M.t.R.B. 86 •
l4the White Sulphur Sprin~s Hotel, 85 N.L.R.B. 1487.
16See , for example, J. Arthur Anderson, 83 N.L.R.B. 1120. ProgressiTe
Cleaners & ~s, Ino., arN.t.R.B. 1299.
16Indianapolis C1earners and Launderers Club, 87 N.L.R.B. 472; New York
Steam Laundry, ino. 85 M.t.R.B:-r591.
17Standard SerTioe Bureau, 87 N.L.R.B. 1406. Rheinstein Construotion ~.,
Inc., 88 N.t.R.S. 46; COlumbia Reporting ~., 88 N.t.R.B. 168.

12
reveals why the Board in 1950 established standards to govern the exercise
of its jurisdiotion.

CHAPTER IV

THE 1950 AND THE 1954 STANDARDS FOR
ASSERTING JURISDICTION
In Ootober, 1950 the Board unanimously issued a series of deoisions which
set forth various standards to govern the future exeroise of jurisdiotion in
the forty-eight State •• l

It deolared that it would generally take juriadie-

tion over oasel involving enterprises in the following categories:
1.

Instrumentalities and ohannels of commerce, interstate or
foreignJ 2

2.

Publio utilities and transit 8ystems,3

3.

Establilhments operating
enterpr1se;4

4.

Enterprises produoing or handling goods destined for out-of-state
shipment, or performing 8erviees outside the State in whioh the

8S

an integral part of a mult18tate

rOi

lIn
£. lelley, 96 N.L.R~B. 6, the Board held that ita general polioies
on jurisd cion did not apply to enterprise8 within the Di8trict of Columbia
or any territory sinoe Seotion 2(6) of the Aot gave it plenary jurisdiction
over luch enterprises. It is submitted that 8uch a distinotion has no real
foundation end indioates the loose thinking whioh has oocurred in this area.
The writer believe. that the existence of plenary jurisdiotion is important
only in determining whether legal jurisdiotion exists, and oan lee no reason why 1t better effeotuates the polioy of the Aot to exeroise jurisdiotion
over one firm and not over another one of equal size solely beoause the
first firm is 100& ted in the Distriot of Columbia.

2w.~.£.!., ~.. 91 N.L.R.B. 630.
3Looal Transit Lines, 91 N.L.R.B. 623.
4The Borden Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 628.

IS

the firm is looated, valued at twenty-five Thousand Dollars a
year ;6
5.

Enterprises furnishing goods or servioss of Fifty Thousand
Dollars a year or more to oonoerns in oategories (1), (2), or
(4) ,6

6.

Enterprises with e direot inflow of goods or materiels from outof-State valued at Five Hundred Thousand Dollars a year,7

7.

Enterprises with an indireot inflow of goods or materials
at One Million Dollars a year,S

8.

Enterprises having suoh a oombination of inflow or outflow of
goods or services, ooming within oategories (4), (5), (6), or
(7), that the peroentages of eaoh of these oategories taken together add up to one hundred,9

9.

Establishments substantially effeoting the nat10nal defense. IO

~1ued

The Board, in these oases, did not intend to substantially reTise ita former
polioies on exeroising jurisdiotion but to "olarify end define where the diffioult line oan best be drawn. ttll
While the establishment of standards brought lome oertitude into this
area, other problems arose to oause the Board, and the parties before it, oonoern; e.g., howlera the standards to be applied where oomplete data were not
available beoause, for example, the company had not yet engaged in operations.
5Stan:i.S.aus Implement ~ Hardware Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 618.
SHollow ~ Lumber ~•• 91 N.L.R.B. 635.
7Federal Dairy, ~., 91 N.L.R.B. 638.
aDorn's House

.2£ Mira oles,

Ino., 91 N.L.R.B. 632.

9~Rutledge r.per Produots, Ino., 91 N.L.R.B. 625.
lOweatport Moving ~ Storage ~., 91 N.t.R.B. 902.
11Uo11ow Tree Lumber ~., ,upra, at p. 636.
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what should be done where the employer is engaged in more thBn one operation
or where there was an assooiation of employers) should the standards be appli
retroaoti Tely.
This latter problem also shows the apparent inoonsistenoies whiqh oan
arise beoause of a polioy of not asserting jurisdiction.

!!.!! ~ Almeida

In Almeida Bus Ser-

BUill Lines, Im, 99 N.L.R.B. 496, decided June 4, 1962, the

Trial Examiner had found that the employer had unlawfully interrogated an employee on August 28, 1960, had refused to bargain with a Union in September
28th beoause of the refusal to bargain.

The Board reTersed the Trial Examiner

and dismissed the oomplaint beoause it felt that the employer had been justified in belieTing that the Board would not assert jurisdiotion OTer hie operationa at the time he oommitted the alleged unfair labor praotioes, pointing
out that its decision in Looal Transit Lines did not issue until October 5,
1950.

The Board stated.

"(W)e are satisfied that equity and fair play re-

quire dismissal .••• n (page 501).12
someone to interfere with the
ohange in the policy of an

le~l

The "equity and fair play" of allowing
rights of employees solely because of a

admin~strative

agenoy is diffioult to understand.

A Tiolation of the law does not oease to be a violation beoause the violator
believes he will not be punished. 13
Another problem whioh oonfronted the Board was whether or not the stand-

l2See also Sorew Maohine Produots. 94 N.L.R.B. 1609.
13It is gratifying to note that in 1958 the Board reoogniled the injustice and stated that the 1958 standards would be applied to suoh oases sinoe
a respondent's belief that the Board would not assert its jurisdiotion did not
give it "any le~l, moral or equitable right to violate the proTisions of the
Aot." Siemons Mailing Servioe. 122 N.L.R.B. No. 13.

16
srda should be applied to oertain industries, suoh as building and oonstruetion and hotels.

Subsequent to Tart-Hartley the Board had assertedi ts juri.-

diotion in the building industry, and in one seoondary boyoott oa8e had
stated that it felt oalled upon to exeroise the Board's bull power in such
oa8es. 14 Arter the adoption of the standards, the Board made it olear that
they would be applied to the building and oonstruotion industry just as to
other industries. IS

As to the hotel industry,

8

majority of the Board held

that its former polioy of deolining jurisdiotion over hotels in forty-eight
States should continue, regardless of the standards. 16
The 1960 atandard. continued in efreot, with minor variations, until 1954,
when a riajority of the Board announoed s revision of the standards whioh substantially limited the area in whioh the Board would exeroise jurisdiotlon. l7
The majority of the Board stated that in ruture oases jurisdiotion would
be asserted only if the enterprise involved could meet one of the following
standards I
1.

General Standards for Other-Then-Retail Establishments:
(a)

14Ira

.!..

Reoeipt of goods or materials annually from out of State valued
at Five Hundred Thousand Dollars or more.

Wa tson ~ •• 80 N .L.R.B. 633.

l6Jame.town Builders Exohange, ~., 93 N.L.R.B. 386; Paul W. Speer. Ino ••
94 N.L.R.B. 317.
----16Hotel Assooiation

£! St. Louis,

92 N.L.R.B. 1388.

17N• L• R• B• New. Release No. 446 (July 1. 1964); N.L.R.B. New. Release No.
449 (July 15. 1964); N.L.R.B. Hews Release No. 467 (October 28. 1964). See
Nineteenth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board, -(Washington.
1956), pp. 2-6.
--
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(b)

Produoing or hand!ng goods and shipping suoh goods out of
State, or performing services outside the Stete, valued at
Fifty Thousand Dollars or more.

(0)

Reoeipt of goods or materials from other enterprises in the
same State whioh those other enterprises reoeived from out of
State valued at One Million Dollars or more.

(d)

Furnishing goods or servioes to enterprises coming within subparagraph (b), above, or to publio utilities or transit systeDUl,
or ins trumenta 11 ties or channels of oommeroe and their essential
links whioh meet the jurisdiotional atandards established for
suoh enterprises, and
(i)

Suoh goods or services are direotly utilized in the produots, services, or prooesses of suoh enterprises and
are valued at One Hundred Thousand Dollers or more; or

(ii) Suoh goode or servioes, regardless of their use, are valued
at Two Hundred Thousand Dollar. or more.
(e)

An establishment whioh is operated as an integral part of a
multistate enterprise; and
(i)

They partioular establishment involved meets any of the
foregoing standardsJ or

(ii) The direot outflow of the entire enterprise amounts to
Two Hundred Thousand Dollars or more; or
(iii) The indireot outflow of the entire enterpriae amounts to

One Million Doller8 or more.
2.

Standard for In.trastate Links of Interstate Commerce:
Transportation operations or other local aotivities suoh as intrastate transit oompanies whioh oonstitute a link in the ohain of
interstate oommeroe or in the interstate transportation of passengers
where the annual inoome reoeived from servioes whioh oonstitute a
part of interstate oommeroe totals no less than One Hundred Thousand
Dollars.

3.

Standards for Conoerns Doing National Defense BUSiness:
Enterprises engaged in providing goods or servioes direotly related to national defense pursuant to Government oontraots in the
amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars or more a year.

4.

Standards for Retail Conoerns:

18
An exterpris6 operating a single retail store or service establishment if it hed (1) annual purohases direotly from out of State
in exoess ot One Million Dollars (direot inflow). or (2) annual
purohases indireotly from out of state in exoess of Two Million
Dollars (indireot inflow), or (3) seles direotly out of State in
excess ot One Hundred Thousand Dollars (direot outflow).
As to intrastate ohains ot retail stores or servioe establishments, the direot intlow, indirect inflow, or direot outflow ot all
stores in the ohain were totaled. It the totals satisfied anyone
ot these standards, jurisdiotion was asserted over the entire ohain
or over any store or group of stores in it.
6.

Standard for Mul tistete Retail Chains:
Enterprises oomprising a multistate ohain of retail stores or
service establishments if the annual gross sales of all stores or
establishments in the chain exoeeded Ten Million Dollars; otherwise,
only over those individual stores or establishments whioh comprised
integral parts of the ohain and which independently satisfied a
standard set forth in paragraph (4) above.

6.

Standard for Franohised Dealer:
Looal reteil establishments whioh have a franohise agreement
with a multistate enterprise only if the establishment meets one of
the jurisdiotional requirements applied to looal retail e.tabli8~entl

1.

Standard for Offioe Buildings:
Office buildings operations when the employer whioh owos or
leases and whioh operates the otfioe building is itself otherwise
engaged in interstate oommeroe and also utilizes the building primarily to house its own·oftices.

s.

Utilities and Transit Systems#
Looal publio utility and transit systems affecting oommerce
whose gross volume of business exoeeded Three Million Dollars per
annum.

9.

Newspapers:
Newspaper oompanies whioh hold membership in or subsoribed to
interstate new services, or published syndioated features, or advertised nationally sold produots, if the gross value of business of the
partioular enterprise involved amounted to Five Hundred Thousand
Dollars or more per annum.

19
10.

.A sso oia tion

of &ployers:

All assooiation members who partioipated in multie.mployer bargaining was oonsidered as a single employer and the totality of
the operation of the assooiation members was considered.
11.

Communications Conoerns:
Radio and television stations, and telephone end telegraph systems if the annual gross inoome of the enterprise involved amounted
to at least Two Hundred Thousand Dollars.

12.

Restaurants:
The same standards established for retail stores.

13.

Taxioabs:
No standard: refused to assert jurisdiotion.

The leading 08se setting forth the views of the majority - Chairman Farmer and Members Rodgers and Beeson - and the separate dissenting view. of
Members Murdook e.nd Peterson is Breeding Transfer

~.,

110 N.L.R.B. 493.

It

i8 to be noted that all three members of the majority were appointed by President Eisenhower ,18 whereas Members Murdook and Peterson WAre holdovers from the
previous administration.
The majority of the Board

p~edioted

that the revised standards would ra-

duoe it. oaseload by no more thgn 10 per cent and that no more than one per
oent of the total number of employees subjeot to the Board's legal jurisdiotion would be affeoted.

They advanced four major reasons for the changes:

(1) the problem of bringing the osseload of the Board down to manageable a11e,
(2) the desirability of reduoing an extraordinary large o8saloed so that edequate attent10n could be given more important cases, (3) the relative import18Chairmen Farmer took office July 13, 1953) Member Rodgers on August 28,
1953; and Member Beeson on Maroh 2, 1954.

20

enoe to the national economy of essentially looal enterprises as against thoae
having

8

truly substantial impact on our eoonomy, and (4) over-all budgetary

polioies and limitations.

They expressly denied that a desire to ests .... l1l11h

broader State jurisdiction was a faotor in their deoision.

They did statel

If one of the inevitable oonsequenoos of our action is to leave a somewhat larger area for local regulation of disputes, we do not share
our oolleagues· apparent view that this is a sinister development. 19
Member Murdock dissented vigorously arguing that the new standards "aeoomplished a drastio ourtailment in the area of proteotion" afforded by the
Aot, and were "premised upon the view that there should be e re-alloce.tion of

author1 ty between the Federal Government and the States in the regulation of
lBbor relations ."20

He quoted, in his dissenting opinion, e:xoerpts from pub-

lie speeohes made within the preoeding year by Chairman Farmer and Member

Rodgers which he felt substantiated his sbltemant:
The slash in jurisdiotion now oonsummated has been frequently premised
and predioted in publio speeohes of members of the majority during the
past year in keeping with an announoed belief in the philosophy of returning a greater ahare of Federal authority to State and looal
governments. 21

Member Murdook predicted that the new standards would el1mina te at least
twenty-fi.e par cent and perhaps 33-1/3 per oent of the Board's jurisdiotion,
and protested the statistioal approach taken by the majority in its prediotion
that only ten por cent of the caseload and one per oent of the employees would
be affected.

He also oontended and that the Board had had a manageable

19110 N.L.R.B. at p. 497.

20~., pp. 600-601.
21~., p. 502.

0886-

21
load sinoe 1950 and that. shortly before the adoption of the new standards,
only sixteen complaint cases and eighteen representation cases were available
for assignment to legal assistants needing new assignmenta.

As to the majori-

ty'. citation of "overall budgetary polioies and limitations, n he stated the
facts showed "no pressing budget difficulties and in fact a voluntary reduotion in the staff of the agenoy in the paat year. ,,22

Murdock also argued

against exoluding enterpriaes from the area in whioh the Board would exeroiae
its jurisdiotion inasmuoh as such enterprises m.ight fall in a "no man's land"
of labor disputes, in whioh the Board will not, and other agencies oannot, aot.
In a separate dissenting opinion. Member Peterson stated that, while he
believed that the Board had the legal authority to establish a jurisdiotional
plan, he objeoted to the new plan beoause of "what strikes me a8 it. arbitrary
and oategorical oharaoter."23

Arguing that one could only speoulate as to the

feotors giving rise to the new plan, he agreed that, beoause of this
It is not only plausible but natural to infer, 8S Member Murdook
suggests, that the new standards had their genesis in a deoision to
oonfine the Board to 8 muoh narrower jurisdiotion 80 that a oon8iderable amount of Federal authority • • • would be admini8tratively reallocated to the State gOTe~nment8.24
This disagreement between the members of the Board

8'

to the reason. tor

the extensive ohanges in its jurisdiotional standards was unfortunate, in the
writer's opinion.

It is a generally acoepted taot that union leader. and

union lawyers have argued for more federal intervention in the field of

22~., p. 517.

23~., p. 527.

24Ibid., p. 528.

22
industrial relations whereas most management representatives have sought less
federal, and more state, intervention in this field.

This fect, coupled with

the taot that the three members of the majority were appointed by President
Eisenhower and that two of them had made public statements indioating

8

per-

sonal desire to return more power to the statea gave rise to the beliet among
many atudents of this area that the new standards were an attempt by the Board
to usurp Congress' prerogatives by resolving the polioy question of how muoh
federal law i8 neoessary and desirable:
In view of the publio statements • • • , it would be naive to assume

that a desire to release some of the federal government's labor
power to the states was not a180 a strong foroe behind the deoision • • •• Even more broadly, oonsiderations of how muoh law 1s
aotually neoessary or desirably today in the labor field may have
played a signifioant part in m~ing the new standards. These,
however, ere basio polioy questions whioh should be resolved by
the legislature and not the administrative fiat. Yet, by denying the presenoe of suoh oonsiderations and relying solely upon the
issue of a burdensome 08seload the new Board appears to ~ve taken
from Congress the taak of remodeling the act • • • • 26
In addition, the oontention of the majority that only ten per oent of its
oaseload and one per oent of oovered employees would be affected appears to
have been statistically unsound •. A study of the actual effects of the new
standards is beyond the soope of this work.

However, a few years ago the

writer helped prepare oertain exhibita for a labor organization, whioh was
oontesting the Boara's Three Million Dollars annual volume of business standards for the local transit indultry.

These exhibits, based on the data

26"N.L.R.B. Jurisdiotional Standards and State Jurisdiction," 60 Northwestern ~. Review. 190 at 196 (1965). See a180 John P. Henderson, "The
~o~an's Land' Between State and Federal Jurisdiotion," 8 Labor Law Journal
587 (1957), and Wilbur L. Pollard, "Federal Labor Law: Adminiatra-r:ive ~e
ceSSion," 30 Notre ~ Lawyer 447 (1956).

23
available as to this industry, showed that approximately 37-1/2 per oent of
the employees of looal transit companies subjeot to the Act end over ninetyfive per oent of such companies would be excluded from the Board's jurisdiotion by the 1954 standards, and that,

BB

an example of the magnitude of the

ohanged standards, not one intra-stete, privately owned looal transit oompany
in the State of Illinois met the Board's new jurisdiotional standard. 26

In its

deoision in this oase, Charleston Transit Companr, the Board majority did not
see the need to ohallenge the reliability of the Union"

exhibits since it

held that it was interested in total oaseload of the Board end not in the
effeot on one partioular industry:
The primary consideration was the reduotion of the Board's oassload,
and • •• staff studies had indioated tha t tho total effect of the
adoption of the 1954 standards • • • would be to reduoe the Board'.
normal oaseload by ten per oe~t. The Union does not challenge the
oorreotness of this estimate. 7
The writer cannot but agree with Member Murdock's oomment that
(t)o deny the merit in the Union's suooessful attack on the impaot
of the transit standard • • • on the ground that the Union has not
suooessfully ohallenged the Board'. estimate as to the effect of
all the standards on its oaseload, is an exeroise in logio whioh
I do not fol10w. 28

This i& espeoially 80 inasmuoh a& the staff studies of the Board as to the
impaot of the new standards were never made available for study.
In its decision in Breeding Transfer Companl, the majority stated,
The purpose of our jurisdiotional ohanges being to eliminate
26 See dissentinf!; opinion of Member Murdook in Charleston Trend t Companr,
118 N.L.R.B. 1164 at p. 1173.
27 118 N.L.R.B. at p. 1168.
28

118 N.L.R.B. at p. 1174.
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purely looel aativities, the true impaot of our change is more intelligently understood in terms of the number of employees effeoted
rather than by the number of oompanies excluded. 29
The writer believes that the Board was in error in its relianoe on this faotor.
Two or three firms in a partioular industry may employ seventy or eighty per
oent of the total employees in that industry while twenty or thirty firms may
employ the remainder.

A jurisdiotional standard which eliminated all by the

employees of the two or three firms would only exolude twenty or thirty per
oent of the employees.

But if the two or three firms were unionized, espeoial-

1y for any extensive period of time, it would be unlikely that the employees
of those firms would have need to invoke the proteotion of the Aot tnough the
Board.

Thus, the aatual result of a standard might well be to exclude only

the employees who need and desire the servioes of the Board.

It is the

writ~.

opinion that st&tistios are not a true guide to the effeot of any jurisdiotion81 standard.

Rather, the writer believes thet the only important oonllideration

i8 the effeotuation of the polioies of the Aot; figures and statistios oannot
measure the hardships suffered by an employee who has been disoriminated again
by an employer or a labor organizat.ion and disoovers that the federal government oannot help him beoause of a "jur~iotional standard ft artltluially e8tabliahed by an administra tl va agenoy.

29110 N.L.R.B. 493 at p. 499.

CHAPTER V

1964 TO 1959 - DEVELOPMENT OF A
QNO-MAN t S LAND"

Subsequent to the establishment of the 1954 jurisdictional standards,
some State oourts and labor agencies began to take oases in situations where
the national Board would deoline jurisdiotion in aooordanoe with the standards.
In other states the authorities believed that the federal pre-emption rule required that they refrain trom exercising jurisdiction

OVGr

suoh firms, thus

oreating a "no-man's lend" wherein neither federal or Ste,te Laws were effeotiv
The federal pre-emption rule or federal "suprema oy" dootrine it! deeply
rooted in our legal history.

Clause 2 of Artiole VI of the United States

Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuanoe thereof; and all Tree. ties made I or whioh sha 11
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State ahall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Cansti tution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
In 1819 the Supreme Court, in MoCullooh !.. Maryland, 4 Whea t. 316, applied this
olause to hold invalid

8

State tax upon notel issued by a branoh of the Bank

or the United States, stating ttthe States have no power, by taxation or otherwi.e, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of
the oonstitutional laws enaoted by Congress to oarry into exeoution the power

25

r

28

vested in the general government."
the 08se of Gibbons

~.

4 Wheat. at 436.

A few years later, in

Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), the Court held that certain

ata tutea of the Sta te of New York ooncerning the us e of Ste te

W8

ters by steam

vessels were nul and void insofar as they applied to certain vessels lioenaod
by the United States.

Thus, the Court held that even though the State statutes

were legitimetely enaoted pursuant to State authority, they oould not interfere with, or be oontrary to, the laws of Congress made in pursuance of the
Constitution.
In 1915, Mr. Justioe Holmes in Charleston & W. Carolina
~.,

231 tI. S 697 at p. 604, stated the rule to be:

the partioular subjeot matter in hand oo-incidence is

!. !.

~.

Varnyille

"'flhen Congress has taken
88

inetfective

88

op-

position, and a state law i8 not to be declared a help beoause it attempt.
to go

~rther

than Congress has seen fit to go."

However,

8S

indicated above,

it was not olear whether this dootrine would apply in an area in whioh Congre.s has pre-empted by legislation but which is left uncovered by the polioie.

ot the agency administering the federal law.
This question remained unanswered until the Supreme Court handed down
three deoision8 in Maroh, 1957.
tI.

s.

In ~~. ~ Labor Relations Board, 353

1, the Court, with two Justioes dissenting, held that, where the National

Labor Relations Board had legal jurisdiotion, eState agenoy hed no jurisdiotion to aot eTen though the Boa rd had deolined, or ObTiously would haTe deolined, to exeroiae its jurisdiotion Deoause Congress had oompletely displaoed
state power to aot exoept where the Board had oeded jurisdiotion pursuant to
Seotion 10 (8) of the National Lebar Relations Act.l

The Court aoknowledged

lSection 10 (a) empower. the Board to oede jurisdiotion to State agenoies

27

that its deoision would result in a "no-mants land" but said that the remedy
was to be found elsewhere:

Congress is free to ohange the situation at will. • •• The
National Labor Relations Board oan greatly reduoe the e.rea of the
no-man's land by re-asserting its jurisdiotion end • • • by ooding
jurisdiotion • • • • The testimony given by the Chairman of the
Board before the Appropriations Committees shortly before the 1954
revisions of the jurisdiotional standards indioates that its reasons
for making that ohange were not baSically budgetary. They had more
to do with the Board's oonoept of the olass of oases to whioh it
should devote its attention • • • •2
In Amalgamated

~

Cutters

~.

Fairlawn Meats, Ino., 853 U.S. 20, the

rna jori ty of the Court held that a state oollrt did not have jurisdiotion of an

interstate employer's aotion to enjoin oertain pioketing by. union sinoe
suoh pioketing is governed by the Taft-Hartley Act, avon if the National Labor
Relations Board would deoline jurisdiotion on the basis of its jurisdiotional
standard.

A

similar holding of the Court is found in

~

Diego Building Trades

Counoil !. Garmon, 353 U. S. 26, whioh involved a situetionwherein the Nation-

81 Board had already dismissed a petition filed by the employer on jurladiotional grounds.
Two Justioes dissented

fro~

the holdings in the above three oase8 on the

grounds that the Board had disoretion to refrain from exeroiaing its jurisdiotion and that Section 10 (8) was not intended to eliminate the power of the
States to act when the Board deolined to take jurisdiotion.

over any case8 in any industry (with oertain exceptions) "unless the provision"
of the St~ta or Territorial statute applioable to the determination of suoh
oases ~ such agenoy i . inoonsistent with the oorresponding provision of this
Aot or has received a oonstruotion inoonsistent therewith."
235~ U. S. at pp. 11-12.

28
The ~ deoision plaoed the responsibility for the "no-man's land n
squarely on the shoulders of Congress and/or the Board.

Both of these bodies

reoognir.ed that a situation whereby thousands. and perhaps millions, of employees and their employers were left to the law of the jungle was intolerable
end took steps to reraedy it.

Various bills introduoed during the 86th Congreaa

were designed to diminish or eliminate the I'tno-msn's larld:"
troduced by Congressman Laird

(R.,

H. R. 9676, in-

Wisoonsin), provided that the National Labo

Relations Aot be amended so es to allow the states to handle oases deolined by
the Board; S.

30~8

whioh had a similar provision was introduoed by Senator

Smith (R., lIew Jersey); Senator Watkins (R., Utah) introduced S. 3692 wherein
he proposed that the

Bo~rd

be authorized to deoline jurisdiotion es en exeroise

of its disoretion end the. t nothing in tho Taft-Hartley Act should be construed
to prevent any state agency or court from assuming jurisdiotion over labor
disputes where the Boara so deolined; and the muoh publicltec. Kennedy-has
(S. 3974) would have made it mandatory upon the Board to exeroise the full

statutory jurisdiotion over all cases, exoept those oeded to state labor boards
by an agreement under Section 10, (Ill).
While all of the above bills failed to pass in the 86th Congress, somo
help

W68

given by voting increased appropriations for the

$1,500,000

Bo~rd,

of which

was fer the express purpose of enabling the Board to lower its

jurisdiotion standards, thereby reduoing the ares of the ~no-man'8 land."!
Chairman Leodo. had testified before

9.

Rouse sub-oommittee that if this addi-

tional amount were appropria ted the Board could lower the standards and take

3S• Rapt. 1719, 85th Cong. 2d Sess.; House (oonferenoe) Rept. No. 1666,
85th Cong., 2d Sess.

29

twenty per oent of the

081es

rejeoted under the 1964 standards.

4

The Board'.

appropriation for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1959, was #13,100,000, almost $4,000,000 more than the $9,384,800 appropriated for fisoal year 1968. 5

On October 2, 1958, the Board publioly announoed the adoption of new
jurisdiotionel standards to be applied
ture

08S08.

6

88

of that date to ell pending and fu-

The new standards are: 7

(1) Non-retail enterprises: $50,000 outflow or inflow, direot or
indireot. (Direot outflow refe~s to goods shipped or services furnished by the employer outside the State. Indireot outflow inoludes
salss within the State to users meeting any standRrd exoept solely an
indireot inflow or indireot outflow standard. Direot inflow refers
to goods or servioes furnished direotly to the employer from outside
the State. Indireot inflow refers to the purohase of goods or services whioh Originated t:lutside the Elltployer' s State but whioh he
purohased from a seller within the State.)
(2) Offioe Buildings: Gross revenue of $100,000, of whioh
'25,000 or more h derived from enterpr18es which m",et the new
standards.
(3)

Retail oonoerns:

'600,000 gross volume of business.

(4) Instrumentalities, linke, and ohannels of interstate
oommeroe: $50,000 from interst~te (or linkage) part of enterprise, or from services performed for employers in oommeroe.
(5)

rata i 1

Publio Utilities:' $250,000 gross~lume, or meet the nonrd •

II tends

(6)

Transit aystemsi

t250,000 gross volume.

4Aa reported in 42 Labor Relations Report No. 13, at p. 185, (Bureau ot
National Affairs, WaShington), June 16, 1958.
-As reported in 42 L.R.R. No. 25 at p. 368 (July 28, 1958).
6N • t • R• S •

Press Release R-616.

See also Twenty-third Annual Report of

the National Labo.:: Relations Bonrd (Washington, 1959), p. 8.
7 Ib1d •

30

(7) Newapapers and oommunioation systemsl Redio, television,
telegraph, and telephone: $100,000 gross volume; newspapers, $200,000
gross volume.
(8)

National defense.

Substantial impaot on national defenae.

(9)

Business in the Territories and Distriot of Columbia.

D. c.
Plenary
Territories-- Standards apply.
(10) Assooiations:

Regarded

single employer.

8S

The Board set forth the general aonsideration whioh led it to revise the
standards in Saimons Mailing Serviae, 122 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 43

L.R.R.~.

1066.

It aoknow1edged that the new standards did not oover all enterprises over

whioh it had legal jurisdiotion and that

II

"no-man'

8

land'" would still exist.

Hut it defended thil rasul t on the grounds tha t the new standbrds would bring
its

08S

eload to the maximum workload whioh could be

~pedi tiously

and effeotiv

handled by the Board and its staff wi thin existing budgetary polioies and
limitations."8

In this oase the Board also defended the use of jurisdiotional

standards in determining whether or not to assert jurisdiotion rather than an
~ ~

or O$se-by-case approaoh, stating that its experienoe under the 1950

and 1964 standards ciemonstrated that standards "significantly reduoe the amount
of time, energy and fundI expended by the Board and its steff in the invest!gation end resolution of jurisdiotional il8ues, thus ena bUng the Boo rd to
devote a grtiSter portion of the resouroes to the prooessing of substantive
problems in a graa tar number of 08ses. it
Subsequent to the establishment of the above standards, the Board set a

8122 N.L.R.B. No. 13 at p. 4, 43 L.R.R.M. at i. 1067.

r
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$500,000 gross annual business jurisdiotional standard for hotels and motels,
other than residential hotels. 9

This establishment of a standard for the

hotel industry was a first in Board history for until the deoision of the
Supreme Court in Hotel Employees Looal

~. ~y.

Leedom, 358 U. S. 99, the

Board had refused to assert jurisdiotion over hotels in the Statel, both before and after the adoption of jurisdiotionel standards. IO

In the Hotel

Employees oase the Court Simply stated that the Board'. long standing polioy
not to exeroise jurildiotion over the hotel industry as a 01a8S was oontrary
to the prinoiples expressed in Offioe

In the latter

081e

~ployees ~. ~bor

Board, 353 U. S. 313.

the Supreme Court was presented with the question whether

the Board may, by applioation of general standards of olassifioation, refuse
to auert any jurisdiotion over labor unions
ployers.

88

a olass when they aot a8 em...

(Section 2 (2) of the Aot speoifically exemptl labor organizations

from the definition of "employer" exoept when they are aoting

81

an employer.)

The Court pointed out that Congress in amending the Wagner Aot did not exolude
unions when acting al employers and held that an arbitrary blanket exolusion
of union employers aa a 01as8

wa~

beyond the power of the Board.

The 1968 jurisdiotional standards oertainly should materially reduoe the
area of the "no-manta land."

But nothing ahort ot oomplete elimination 11

aooeptable to anyone interested in peaoeful labor-management relations.
A "no-man'

9

8

land" presents an intolerabl It Ii tuatlon.

44 Labor Relations Reporter No.5 at p. 45 (May 18, 1959.

lOSee Willard, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 1094; Parkside Hotel, 74 N.L.R.B. 809,
THe White Sulphur srngs ~., 86 N.L.R.B. 1:481; ROtel Association of St.
Louis, 92 N.L.R.B. S88.
-- --
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The popularly known Kennedy-Ervin bill a. introduoed to the ourrent Congress (a. 506, 86th Congress 1st Session) would have eliminated the "no-man's
land ft by requiring the Board to assert jurisdiotion over all labor dispute.
falling within its legal jurisdiotion except where a oession agreement wes
effeotive.

The administration's "Labor-Management Praotioes Aot of 1959 ft

(s. 748) would have authorized the Board to deoline to assert jurisdiotion

over oases where, in its opinion, the effeot on oommeroe was not suffioiently
substantial.

State agenoies and oourts would be permitted to aot with respeot

to suoh oases. ll
as S. 1566.

The Kennedy bill was revised in oommittee and reintroduoed

As so revised, the Board was required to exeroise its full juris-

diotion but permitted it to enter into agreements with State agenoies to have
the latter exeroise jurisdiotion in the "no-man's land," applying federal law
. in aocordanoe with deoisions of the Board and the federal oourts.
The Senate itself rewrote the oommittee-approved bill's provision as to
jurisdiotion by aooepting an amend.ant whioh does not require the Board to
assert its jurisdiotion over all O8ses but permits State or Territorial agenoies other than a oourt to exercise jurisdiotion ·over all oases over whioh th
Board has jurisdiotion, but by rule or otherwise, has deolined to assert
jurisdiotion."

The amendment retained the provision that the agenoy apply

federal law in aooordanoe wi th Boa rd and federal court rules of deoisions.

As

so amended the Kennedy bill passed the Senate April 25, 1959. 12
IlA oompariaon of the two bills prepared by the Office of the Solioitor
of the U. S. Department of Labor 1s reported at 43 L.R.R. No. 27 at pp. 326339.

12 the full text of the bill (5. 1556 aa approved is reported at 43 L.R.R.
No. 51, pp. 664-686.
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Whether the Kennedy Bill will pass the Houle of Representatives without
amendment 1s oonsidered unlikely by many authorities. l3

In addition, Presi-

dent Eisenhower is reported to have been oritical of the bill's provisiona
on the Dno-man's land" saying that there should be a "definite law here to
confer or to reoognize that authority of the states to moet those partioular
problema. tt14
The major difficulty of the "no-man's land" provision of the Kennedy bill
is that few states have labor agenoies whioh oould take jurisdiotion ,nd relieve the national Board or eliminate the 'he-man' s land:
a1 Affairs reports that

8S

The Bureau of llation-

of Maroh, 1959, only ten states and Hawaii and

Puerto Rioo have suoh agenoies, and that only five of these are similar in
structure to the Board. lS

Very likely, these states oould adopt any neoessary

revisions to satisfy the requirements of the Kennedy bill without diffioulty.
The remaining states, however, would need legislation to establish labor
agenoies and would have the further diffioulty of seouring oompetent personnel to staff them.

It appears doubtBul that even a majority of these thirty-

nine .tates will inour the finanoial obligations oonneoted with suoh agenoies
in order to exeroise jurisdiotion in the present "no-man's" area, unless they
believe that their intra-state firms need an agenoy and/or believe that the
federal Board will again raise its standard. onoe suoh agenoies are establishe

l3Ses 44 L.R.R. No.1, pp. 1-2.
14 Ibid ., p. 1.

1543 L.R.R. No. 43 at p. 577.

r
CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
It 18 evident from the above historical development of the Board's jurisdiction and its exercise of that jurisdiction that this matter has troubled
the Board and the intere8ted parties that use its processes from the establishment of the Board in 1956 up to the present.

It is al.o apparent that

difficulties will oontinue to be present in the future unless affirmative steps
are taken.
The above history a180 reveals that the Board has been olearly wrong in
the pest, e.g., in its position as to unions
try.

8S

employers and the hotel indus-

It is this writer's oI*tion that the Board may have been also in. error

in refusing to exeroise jurisdiction where it had legal jurisdiotion and,
particularly, when it e.tablished standards for the exeroise of its jurisdiotion.

While this opinion is definitely in the minority of those legal writers

who have treated the question of the Board's jurisdiotion, it has substantial
support from a legal viewpoint.

Only when praotical oonsiderations are given

weight does a need for disoretion in exercising jurisdiction arise.

And, it

is doubtful, in the writer'a opinion, that the Board's aotion has been the

most praotioal.
During consideration of the original Wagner Act (National Labor Relation8
Aot) Senator Wagner, himself, proposed to define ftemployer" in a way whish
54

r
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would have exoluded businesses with le88 than ten employees from the jurisdiotion of the Board.

This was rejeoted because Congres8 sought the full limit

of the oommeroe power and did not want to deprive any employees of their rights
under the law merely because they worked a small plant.

In this oonneotion

the Senate Labor Committee stated:
After deliberation, the Comndttee deoided not to exolude employees working for very small employer units. The rights of employees should not be denied beoause of the size of the plant in
whioh they work. Seotion 7 (0) imposes no. suoh limitation. And
in oases where the organization of workers is along oraft or industrial lines, very large aS8ooi&tiona ot workers fraught with
great publio signifioanoe may exist, although all members work in
very small establishments. Furthermore, it is olear that the
limitations of this bill to events affecting interstate oommeroe
is suffioient to prevent intervention by the Federal government in
oontroversies of purely local significanoe. l
It is thus olear that the Congress whioh provided for the entranoe of the
federal government into the area of industrial relations did not favor restriotions on the rights of employees of small employers.
The Supreme Court, as noted above, 8upported this Congre8sional intent in
the early oases upholding the jurisdiotion of the Board.
that these

c~ses

V{hile it is true

did not oonoern the question of whether or not the Board had

disoretion to decline to exeroise ita jurisdiction the language of the Court i .
partioularly significant.
Although aotivities may be intra8tate in oharacter when separately
considered, if they have suoh 8 olose and substantial relation to
interstate oommerce that their control is essential or appropriate
to proteot that commeroe from burdens and obstruotiona, Con~reas
oannot be denied the power to exeroise that oontrol • • • •

lSenate Report No. 573, 74th Congress, 1st Session (1935).
2!.~.!.!. ~. Jones! Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.

s.

1 at p. 37.
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• • • Examining the Aot in the light of ita purpose end of the oiroumstanoes in whioh it must be applied we oen peroeive no besis for inferring any intention of Congress to make the operation of theAot depend on any partioular volume of commeroe affected more than that to
whioh oourts would apply the lIU!lxim .2.! minimis.
There are not a t.~eVf industries in the United States whioh, though
conduoted by rel~tively small units, oontribute in the aggregate a
vast volume of interstate oommeroe • • • • It is not to be supposed
that Congress • • • intended to exclude suoh industries from the
sweep of the Aot • • • .3
Appropriate for judgment is the feot that the immediate situation is
representative of many others throughout the country, the total inoidenae of whioh if left unoheoked may well beoome far-reaohing in
its harm to oommeroe. 4
These oases show that the Supreme Court, as well a8 the Board at that
time, understood that

8

partioular situation may not be viewed in isolation

and that the nature of the industry, the extent of unionization, eto., must be
oonsidered.

These factors must be remembered when thought is given to the

right of the Board to set genoral standards for the exeroise of jurisdiotion,
whioh standards praotioally ignore the individual aspeots of a partioular OS8e.
The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 reveals no substantial congressional approval of the Board's jurisdiotional pOlicies.

Ac-

tually, we find affirmstion of tta idea that the size of the employer should
not be determinative.

Two union practioes whioh Congress intended partioularly

to regulate in 1947 were the seoondary boyoott and the closed shop, both of
whioh are often found in industries oompriled of small employers, e.g., the
oonstruotion industry.

In this oonneotion, we find Senator Taft stating,

"(L)arger employers oan well look after themselves, but • • • there are
!oN.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt .t al., 306 U. S. 601 at pp. 606-607.
---- -'Polish National Allianoe ~. ~.~.!.!.. 322 U. S. 643 at p. 648.
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hundreds of sllBller employers • • • who • • • have oome

gradually to be at

the meroy of the labor union leaders."5
The Taft-Hartley Aot amended the Wagner Aot in another respeot Having a
bearing on the question of the Board's disoretion as to jurisdiction.

The

Aot in Seotion 3 (d) oreates the office of General Counsel separate from and
independent of, the five-member Board, and gives the General Counsel

~FID11

authority, on behalf of the Board, in respeot of the investigation of oharges
and issuanoe of oomplaints under Seotion 10, and in respeot of the proseoution
of auoh complaints before the

Board.~

The first General Counsel after the

pl.sage of Taft-Hartley, Robert Denham, took the position that if he issued a
complaint in an unt&ir labor CBse the Board had no disoretion to decline hearing the oase •• 6 lir. Denham was also of the opinion that jurisdiotion should
be exerted to the limit authorized by law.

"Atter unsuooessfully opposing

the Board in several oaaes • • • Mr. Denham aired the oontroversy publioly
• • • oharging the Board with applioation of 'their old Wagner Aot formulae'
when 'the prinoiple of the theory has been repudiated by the pa.sage of the
Taft-~rt1ey

Act' • • • •,,1

The issue was squarely presented to a federal Court of Appeals in

59:5 Baily Cong. Reo. 3950 (April 23, 1941); Leiislattve History of the
Labor Management Relations ~ 1947 (Washington 194 ) It, p. 1005.
-- --6Fora similar position as to the elimination of any disoretion in the
Board see Sylvester Petro, ~ ~ !.~.!!..!!.. Repealed .!!!!-Hartley, (Washington,
1968), Cha pter 8.
1 B• J. George, Jr., ftTaft-Hartley Aot--Right of Board to Dismiss Unfair
Labor Praotice Complaints for Policy Reason8,~ 48 Miohigan ~. ~. 11'9 (1950).
quoting Address before New York Building Trades Employers' Assooiation,
January 13, 1950, reproduoed in 16 Vital Speeohes 226-231 (1950).
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Hale8ton Drug Stores, ~. ~. !.~.!.~. (C.A. 9) 187 F. 2d 418, 8 08.e whioh
pre8ent loard Member Fanning believe8 "fairly reflects the general viewn that
the Board has discretionary power to decline to assert ,jurisdiotion. 8

the General Counsel, through

8

After

Regional Direotor, had issued a oomplaint end

proseouted the case before a Trial Examiner, the l.tter dismissed the oomplaint because the Board had, in an election prooeeding, concluded that assertion of jurisdiotion would not effectuate the polioies of the Aot sinoe the
employer's operations were essentially looal in oharaoter.
the dismissal and the General Counsel, inter

~,

The Board affirmed

sought review.

The Court

upheld the position of the Board:
By the express language ot Seotion 10 (.) the Board was and
still is empowered (not direoted) to prevent persons trom agaging
in unfair labor practices affeoting oommeroe. Ita disoretionary
authority in re_peot of its assertion of jursidiotion wal never,
so tar 88 we ere informed, questioned under the Aot 81 it existed
prior to 1947. In N.L.R.B. T. Indiana &; M. Eleotric Co .. , 318 U. S.
9, 18, 19 • • • the-COurt-noted~flltbe-Board hes wide disoretion
in the issue of oomplaints ...... It i. not required by the statute
to move on every aNu'ge; it is merely enabled to do so.' • • • The
Board, itself. without judioial ohallenge, aoted on the assumption
that it could, for rea,ons of polioy or for budgetary or other reasons, deoline to issue an unfair labor praotioe oomplaint, or to
dismiss a oomplaint • • • ~r in its reasoned judgment the policiel
ot the aot would be best served by that course. Of this assumpti3n
and praotioe one cen not doubt that Congress was fully oognizant.
(Emphasis in original~
The Court then analyzed the Taft-Hartley ohanges and conoluded that no ohange
was intended to take the Board's discretion away.

It conoluded that both the

Board and the General Counsel had power to withhold jurisdiotion.

SJohn H. Fanning, -The tNo~ant8 Land' and the National Labor Relations
Board'l Jurisdiotional Polioiel," 8 Catholio U. !!.. Rev. 1 (1959).

9187 F. 2d at p. 421.
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This deoision does not satisfy the writer as one to be the basis of the
"general view."

In the first instanoe, the writer questions the Court's re-

lianoe on the word

~empoweredH

in Seotion 10 (8) for it appears that Congre'8

dd not give suoh significance to it.

In the 80th Congress which passed Taft.

Hartley, the House initially passed H. R. 3020 which provided for an Administrator rather than a General Counsel.

Under Section 10 (b) of that bill the

Administrator, upon the filing of a oharge, wes to investigate suoh oharge,
Mand if he has reasonable oause to believe such charge is true, he shall
issue • • •

8

oomplaint" (emphasiS .uppliedj.

bill stated, "It is only

~

As House Report No. 245 on this

the feots the oomplaint alleges do not oonstitute

an unfair labor praotioe, or when the oomplainant oloarly oannot prove hi'
claim, ~ ~ Administrator has any disoretion not to issua
(Emphasis supplied.)
ference Report No.

II

complaint."lO

The House bill did not pass the Senate but the House Con-

~lO

states that the House-Senate oonferenoe agreement oon-

temp16ted that the duties of the Administrator would be performed "under the
exolusi va and indapendent direotion of the Genera 1 Counsel of the Board" with
no menti..,n being mede of any mor,a disoretion in this offioer. l l
as passed provides that upon the filing of
power to issue ••• a oomplaint:t

8

Section 10 (b)

oharge "the Board ••• shall have

Thus, when we oonsider Rous a Repart No. 246

as to the Administrator's discretion, the oonferenoe report's statement that
the General Counsel is to do the work of the Administrator, and then look at
"Board" and "shall have power" in the Aot, it 11 diffioult to believe that
lOr,eg1s1e.tiva History of the LeboI' Managemant Relations ~1947 (Wash-

ington

1948) I, p. 331.

ll~., p. 557.

-- ---
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"empowered" has the signitioelDce given it by the Court in Haleston. STan thoug
"empowered" is in Seotion 10 (a) whereas the above reports refer to Seotion
10 (b).

It would be inoonceivable to this writer th6t Congress would wish to

give the General Counsel nO discretion as to issuing a complaint for jurisdiotional reasons while the Board, at the same time, hEld such discretion and
was declining to assert jurisdiction.
The writer's seoond objeotion to the Court'

8

reasoning in Bale.ton re-

lates to its conclusion that both the Board and the General Consel have power
to withhold jurisdiction.

In the case befo1 e it, the General Counsel wanted

the Board to take juriSdiction.

But imagine the reverse situation, i.e.,

the General Counsel setting a more restriotive jurisdiotional standard than
the Board would have.

Or imagine a persistent General Counsel who continutld

to apply his own discretion as to jurisdiotion even though he knew that the
Board would ultimete1y dismiss the case in the exeroise of its discretion.
(Such

6

Situation, while not likely, is oertainlya possibility.

For the

General Counsel is appointed for a four year term and rrliy oarry over into th.,
administration of a President

o~

the opposite party with e majority of the

Board soon refleoting his views on jurisdiotion rather than those of th6 Gener81 Counsel.

And, absent 1'lagrant abuses of discretion. oourt review of Board

polioies is only possible if oomplaint has issued.)

Any such situations would

loon become intolerable.
The third objeotion arises from the Court's oitation ot N.L.R.B. v. Ind!~ ~!.

Eleotrio Co. in support of the Board having discretion.

For that

oase, deoided inli43. involved the question ot whether theBoard should reopen
a case and take additional evidenoe ot violence allegedly oommitt.,d by persona

4l

who had been witnessea at the original hearing.

The Court stated:

While we hold that misoonduot of the union would not deprive the
Board of jurisdiotion, this does not mean that the Board may not
properly oonsider suoh misoonduot 8S material to its own deci.ion to
entertain and prooeed upon the oharge. The Board has wide discretion
in the i88u6 of complaints • • •• It i3 not required by the statute
to more on every oharge; it i8 merely enabled to do so • • •• It
may dealine to be imposed upon or to submit its process to abuse.
The Board might properly withhold or dismiss its own oomplaint if it
should appear that the charge is so related to a oourse of violenoe
end destruction, carried on for the purpose of ooercing an employer
to help herd its 9mployees into the complaining union, as to oonstitute en abuse of the Board's process. 12

The writer has difficulty seeing support in such a case, involving possible
abuse of the Board process, end decided before the Board substantially b6gen
declining to exercise jurisdiction for policy reasons, for the Board's aotion
in Baleston.
Some conunentators on the Haleston deoision are cr1 tioal of the Court's
holding on the ground the t the Taft-Hartley Congress. in sape rating the jurisdieial functions and the prosecutionsl functions by establishing the office

of an independent Generel Counsel, intended to remove any discretion in the
Board .13

7his ·f~e.s the pod tion of Mr. Denham.

The wri tar is not cor.v1noed

this contention hea rr..erit. partirularly when Mr. Petro butresses his argument.
wi th implications tha t the Boerd has dalibers tely taken its stend on discret10
so as to allow unions to violete the law without punishment, espeoially in the
consUuetion industry.

Vfuile it is true that Congress was interested in abuses

in the construotion. industry, the writer believl3s there is no basis for

12 318 U. S. at pp. 18-19.
13petro, p. 112, Bernard L. Goodman ~ Robert S. Griggs, "Labor Law Jurisdiction of l-! .LoR.E. Under Se!r-fnq::osed Lim! tetions ,"fI 50 Michigan L. ReT.
899 (1962).
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oonoluding that it intended "speoial legislation" for that indu8try.
Another problem in this area arises from the Haleston deoision. although
not oonneoted with it.

As disoussed above, the Court relied on "empowered" in

Seotion 10 (8) for its holding.

Now Section 10 <a) deals with the Board'.

power to prevent unfair labor praotioes.

Another, and equally important,

funotion of the Board is to oonduot eleotions to asoertain the bargainirlg representative desired by the majority of employees in a bargaining unit.
Seotion 9 (0) of the National Labor Relations Aot provides that "(1) Whenever
8

petition shall have been filed • • • the Board shall investigate • • • and

if it haa reasonable

caUIe

to believe that e. question of representation af-

feoting oommeroe exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due
notioe •• • •

If the Board finds upon the reoord of suoh hearing that suoh

a que.tion of representation exists, it thall direot an eleotion by .eoret
ballot and shall oertify the results thereof."

(Emphasis

supplied~

This u'e

of the manda tory "Shall" oould be partioularly signifioant ina.muoh as the
original Wagner Aot provided in Seotion 9 (0) that the Bo&rd
whenever a question affeoting
of employees.

~mmeroe

mal

investigate

ari.es oonoerning the representation

Thus, the reasoning of the Baleston deoision could not be used

to justify the existenoe in the Board of disoretion not to assert jurisdiotion

in representation

088e..

The Board, however, has never made any distinotion

between oomplaint and representation oa8es in applying its jurisdiotional
standards, and the oourt deoisions relating to disoretion in the Board have
been limited to oomplaint oases.

This is beoause "Seotion 9 • • • makes no

provision a8 it now stands tor review of any order issued thereunder, and thee
is oonsequently no opportunity for judioial re view of the applioation of the

43
'yardstiok' in this oontext, exoept under the

r~mote

possibility that a oourt

would issue mandamus to oompel the Board to disoharge the statutoryduty. ft 14
In

~.!:!..~.~.

!.. DerIver BUilding and Construotion Trades Councll,

~ ~.,

341 U. S. 615, deoided in 1951, the Supreme Court was faoed with the question
of whether pioketing of e looal oonstruotion projeot fteffeoted oommeroe" within the meaning of the Aot.

In its opinion holding that the Board had jurisdic-

tion, the Court stated that even "when the effect of aotivities on interstate
oommeroe is suffioient to enable the Board to take jurisdiotion of e complaint,
the Board sometimes properly declines to do so, stating that the policios ot
the Aot would not be effectuated by its assertion of jurisdiction in that
0688._

16 While this 08se has been oited in support of the Board having dis-

oretion in refusing to assert jurisdiotion because of the volume of business
involved, the statement quoted is diota and

~uld

not be binding in future

08se ••
Another important deoision in this area ia Joliet Contraotors
~.~.!.!. (C.A. 1) 193 F. 2d 833.

The Court set aside the Board"

~. ~.

dismissal of

• oomplaint on jurisdiotional gr9und8, holding that the unfair labor praotioes
.hown had a substantial effect upon commerce and that the Board's conclusion
to the oontrary was olearly erroneou..

ftSuch being the oa88. we think the

Board was without discretionary authority to diam1 •• the oomplaint.
event, it. aotion was an abuse of any disoretion which it had. a16
14GoOdman and Griggs, Supra, p. 906.
15 341 U. S. at p. 684.
16193 F. 2d at p. 844.

In any
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The

C&8e

involved an alleged secondary boycott in the oonstruotion indu.try and

the Court gave great weight to the intent of Congress to stop secondary boycotts.

It rejeoted tho Board relianoe on the Supreme Court's statement in

Denver Building Trades Counoil and stressed the reasoning of Polish National
Allianoe that a case need not be viewed in isolation but may be oonsidered

8S

representative of others throughout the oountry.
The deoision in Joliet Contraotors is subjeot to oritioism on the groun.
that the Court dtd not fully understand and meet the position of the Board. 17
However, this writer believes it to be

88

well reasoned as Raleston and. thus.

it "throws doubt upon the Ii .L .. R.B.' s authority to deoline jurisdiotion in any
part ot the building tradee at least • • • • !t18

And, if valid

8S

to the oon-

.truotion industry, it should apply to all iLdustries sinoe, irthe writer's
opinion, theTaft-Hartley Congress did not intend separate tre.. tment of any industry.

However, it would seem that the Court did not intend this result sinoe

it distinguished, but did not over-rule, its prior deoision in Looal Union No.

!!,

Progre88~.!! Minefiorke rs of Amerioa !.. !.L.! .!!..19 wherein it had agreed

with the Board that the impaot on commeroe was not substantial and upheld its
dismissal of the oomplaint for jurisdiotional reasons.
While other courts have upheld the existenoe of discretion in the Board to
refuse to hear oases for jurisdiotional reasona,20 the Supreme Court has neTer
l7nDisoretionary Administrative Jurisdiotion of the N.L.R.B. Under the
Taft-Hartley Aot:' 62 !!.!!!!. !!.. 116 (1952).
18~., p. 119.

19189 F. 2d 1.

200ptioal Workers, Looal 24859 T. !.~.R_!., 227 F 2d 687, rehearing denied
229 D. 2d 170 (~. A. 5).
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direotly upheld suoh disoretion.

In Guss ~. ~ Labor Re16tiona Board 21 the

Court stated that it haa never passed

~and

we do not pass today" upon the

validity ·of any partioular deolination ot jurisdiotion by the Board or any
,et of jurisdiotional standard• • • • " (referring in e footnote to Denver
Building Trades Counoil).

And in Offioe Employees Union ~. ~.~.R.!., 363 U.

s.

313, the Supreme Court stated, "{w)hile it i. true that 'the Board sometimes

properly deolines to ~ssert jurisdiotio~ stating that the polioies of the Aot
would not be effeotua ted by its a 88ertion

!!!. ~

Labor Board v. Denver Building Counoil • • • • ft

~

(empha sis suppl1 ed)

The Court a180 mentions that

jurisdiotional standards "exolude small employers whose business does not
suffioiently affeot oommerce • • • • But its exeroise of discretion in the
local field doe. not give the Board the pwer to deoline jurisdiotion over all
employers in other fields.
ional power of repeal.

To do so would but grant to the Board the oongress-

See also GUlli v. Utah Labor Relations Board. • •

where the Court refused to pass 'upon the validity of any partioular deolinetion of jurisdiotion by the Board or any set of jurisdiotional standards'."
In a footnote, referred to in tl\e above quota tion the Court m.ention. hotel
cas •• where the Board deolined juri.diotion because of the 10081 oharaoter of
the bUliness as well .s ver1ou. cab oompanies ca.es and .tate., nIn thele oases
the deolination ot jurisdiction was based on the looal oharaoter of the operation.

We indicate neither approval nor disapproval of the.e juriadiotional

deoUnations.,,22
21 363 U.

s.

1.

22303 U. S. at pp. 318, 320.
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In its deoision in Siamons Meiling SarTioe, 122 N.L.R.B. No. 13, wherein
it sets forth the reasoning behind the 1968 standards, the Board oites this
ce.e

8S

affirming the existenoe of the Board's disoretionary authority to de·

oline to assert jurisdiotion whan the polioies of the Aot would not be effect·
uated by its assertion.

The deoision does lend lome support to suoh a view

but, in the wtiter's opinion, it i. by no meanl clear that the Court was aotually affirming the existenoe of suoh disoretion in view of the oautious langu
uled.

Furthermore, sinoe thil issue wes not direotly before the Court, what-

ever it meant i. diotum.

More significant for the Board's position is that

three Justioes joined in Justioe Brennan's oonourring and dissenting opinion,
wherein he wrote, "I am of the view that the Board has disoretionary authority
to deoline to do so when the Board determines, for proper reasons, that the
polioie. of the Aot would not be effeotuated by its assertion of jurisdiction.

On numerou. oocasions between the pa.lage of Taft-Hartley and the prelent
lel.ion ot Congre.s billl were introduced whioh, if palled, would have effected
the

Bo.r~1

juri,diotion.

Senator Smith (R. New Jersey) effered a bill (S. 1785

8Zrd Cong., l.t Se.8.) whioh

wo~ld

involving publio utilities.

Senator Goldwater

bave allowed the stetes to aot in situations

(R. Arizona) introduoed one

(S. 1161, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess.) whioh would have returned to the states jurisdiotion to regulate strike., seoondary boycotts and pioketing even over industries affeating interstate commeroe.

Senator Ivel (R. New York) proposed a bil

(S. 1264, 83rd Cong. 1st Sess.) to give the .tate. freedom to aot in all oases
whioh·did not oome within the National Labor Relations Board's juri.diotional

23!bid., at p. 321.
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standards.

These, and others, failed of passage.

failure is diffioult to asoertain.

The signifioanoe of the

The Goldwater Bill, partioularly, was more

a question of "state's rights" and no real signifioanoe attaohes to ita in.bili
ty to pass.

The lves bill, on the other hand, gave Congress a olear opportuni-

ty to forestell the Guss deoision and the "no-man's lend."
on thh opportunity may have been due to

Ii\.

Its failure to aot

desire to have the National Board

keep and exeroise it. jurisdiotion, due to a belief that the Supreme Court woul
not reaoh the result it did in

~and,

therefore, suoh legislation was un-

necessary, or due to a thousand other oonsiderations.

In any event, the

Kennedy bill of the present s6ssion, detailed above, appears to be the first
legislation whioh olearly indioates speoific oongressional approval of the
Board establishing jurisdiotional standards, by providing for state aotion when
the National Board does not.
It seems evident from the above analysis of legal deoisions and oongressional aotion
cline

~o

p~ior

to the present session that the right of the Board to de-

exeroise itl jurisdiction is not a. olear

ever, most writers, even those

~ho

8S

oommonly believed.

question the Boerd's right, agree that

praotioal matter the Board must decline to aot in

SOlne

How8S

situations or it would

be overburdened with OS8es:
• • • Not~th.tQnding the legislative history of the Aot, few
would question the theory that, if retrenohment of jurisdiotion i. required, those businesses with the least impact on interstet4 oommerce
must, of neoessity, be eliminated first. Furthermore, fixed jurisdiotional standards, even though they are meohanioal in operation, .ppe~r
to present the most praotioal way to measure impact upon oommeroe and,
at the same time, retain the advantage of unifornity and predictability.
• • • 24
2450 Northwestern L. Rev. 190 at 196.

a
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As a purely praotical matter, one may readily agree that 30 little
limitation remains upon the soope of the Board's juri.diotion • • •
that the Board .hould have available some other meens tor restricting
itself to those cases whose oonsiderations wll1 really effectuate the
policy of the act. No other means are provided for in the Ii ot, however.
and it is diffioult to oonoeive how the Board • • • oan oreate one without statutory authority, either by an~logy to the prooedure ot courts
or by exeroise of its administrative discretion. 25
The real problem facing the Board is its inability to hear all labor
disputes whioh fall wi thin the legal lha.1ts of its authority • • • •

... . . . . . ... . . . .. . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .

• • • Tho only check woulc be through the policy of the General Counsel
in issuing complaints. Should suoh restraint in initiating aotion a180
be treated as an abuse of disoretion, the Board could not handle important matters promptly without reoourse to some sort of priority
system. It would tJ.en have to allow other matters to languish on the
dooket, denying effeotive relief. 26

Other writers recognize the practical diffioulties involved and sugge.t
amendments to the Aots

One oannot with sincerity forcefully argue that exolusive jurisdiction resides in the Board if the Board cannot expeditiously hear
and fairly determine the rights of the parties. Perhaps a part of
the solution would be to increase the number of member. on the Board
to the number reoommended when the Taft-Hartley Aot f t . enacted • • • • 21
It 18 not the Board's funotion to ohange the law to oonform with its
own idea of proper policy and prooedure • • • • One oannot but wonder
it the field of labor law has not advanoed to the point where a regular
tribunal presided over by j~dges of oertain tenure is in order • • • •
The Board's deoisions, whioh seem to be .ubject to every ohange in
membership, end to every ohange in political olimate, are a 8trong argument for tribunal (sic) whioh would work out a rational Icope of
coverage and adhere to it. 28
Another oommentator suggests that the answer to the "no-man's land" and

25Goodman and Griggs, sUEra, at 901-902.

--

2662 Yale L. J. 116 at 122-124.

-

27Pollerd. supra, at 468.
a8 B. J. George, Jr., 8upra, p. 1158.
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the Board' a c9seload is for the Board to obtain more money from Concress.29
Written before the reoent increase in the Boerd's appropriation, t:1fJ author
advoootes the establishment of rCigional ::nember bOHrds to oarry out the functions now pe1"fonned

by the

ona Bo&.rd.

"Tho ~ seload could thus bo distributed

among at least five boards rather the.n have the entire burden resting upon the

five men now oharged by Congress •• • •

Pr(~oedent

for such an expansion of

the na tiona 1 DO!if.rd has g,lraady been established in 'the history of the federal
oourts ."30
The a otual need for the Board to deoline asserting jurisdi otion through
the use of standards has been questioned by at least one writer.

"If essential

8tatiltioel data were made available to the Board by way of reporting by the
General Couns6l, the author ventures to prediot that the jurisdiotional stQndardl would not only be rovisad downward, as aooomplished
of 1958, but might 'possibly be abandoned completely.-31

In~he

latter part

The author further

oontends that, regardless of the statistioal results, the Board should abandon
the usa of jurisdiotional standards, sinoe they deprive parties of the publio
rights oreated by Congress and, ,in addi tlon, indireotly make the Board a party
contributing to the open violation of federal law by those below the standards
who know they can violate the law with impunitye

ftCQn the reader visualize the

results ot an announoement by the Internal Revenue Servioe that 'due to work
load and budgetary limitations on personnel aoquisition, all returns with
29Henderson. supra.

30~•• p. S98.

:51 Ernest J. lihi te, "The N.L.R.B. and the General Counsel Revisited," 10
Labor ~ Journa} 266 at 262 (1959).

~--~---.-

"
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ar~ual

gross inoome of $15,000 and under will not be reviewed'? • • •

It is

admitted that the l;loard could not hear every 08se, but would not greeter oomplianoe with the aot be aocomplished if all violators knew that they ran the
risk, in varying degrees, of possiblo Board adjudication?p32
In view of these differenoes of opinion, ell of whioh have some validity,
the writer believes that Congress should study the operation of the Board, as
presently oonstituted, to asoertain whether it is desirable and/or neoessary
for the Board to deoline jurisdiction, either on
the use at jurisdiotional standards.

8

o8se-to-oase basis or through

If this study reveals an aotual need then

Congress should oonsider whether increased appropriations would solve the problem and/or whether there sholAld be ohanges in the structure ot the Board.
Certainly, morley should not be the sole b::.si8 for jurisdiotional standards, espeoially whan the Board has never made a determined bid for inoreased funds and
when

we

oonsider that the annual budget of the agency is only

the federal budget.

a

minute part ot

Congress should bear in mind tha t a "no-man'

8

land" is

intolerable Bnd that the answer of the present Kennedy bill is doubtfully praotical, and. even if practioal, Qerteinly more expensive in the long run to the
state governments.

A solution to the problems in this area must be found.

The Board, itself,

has done more to oreate t~he problem. than to find solutions to them.

Congress,

then, is the body to provide a solution} proteotion of employee!s rights and
stability in labor relations require it.

32.!Eld., pp. 262-263.
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